









All bodies of company law embody and reflect particular assumptions about the nature of 
companies and the relations between those who participate in their activities. In other words, 
they are all underlain by a theory of the company. While the presence of this theory usually goes 
largely unacknowledged, in recent years, as the issue of so-called corporate governance has 
risen to prominence, the nature of the company and, in particular, of the large corporations 
which dominate the economy has become the subject of considerable debate.
1
 With this 
corporate theory has moved much closer to the centre of the company law stage and although 
the claim that this has precipitated a "crisis in corporate law"
2
 is rather exaggerated, there is no 
doubt that in an environment in which there is growing international interest in the relationship 
between corporate governance and competitiveness (and to a lesser extent social justice), the 
debates about corporate theory are proving to be of more than purely academic importance. In 
Britain, for example, seemingly abstract questions about the nature and character of companies 
figure prominently in the consultation document recently produced by the Company Law 
Review Steering Group for the DTI
3
.  
 The two alternative approaches to company law identified by the Steering Group, one 
labelled "enlightened shareholder value", the other "pluralism", broadly reflect the two principal 
rivals within Anglo-American corporate theory: contractual or agency theory, based in law-and-
economics, and stakeholding theory. Contractual theories, which began to crystallize in the U.S. 
in the 1970s and whose influence in the U.K. and elsewhere has since steadily grown, perceive 
the company as a nexus of contracts, most crucially between shareholder-principals and 
director-agents, characterising even large publicly quoted corporations as fundamentally 
voluntaristic, private affairs, the products of freely negotiated contractual exchanges. For 
contractual theorists, the fact that existing corporate structures are the supposed products of such 
processes is prima facie evidence that they are "efficient", "efficiency" in the specific and 
narrow sense in which the term is used within orthodox economic theory being, in their view, 
what company law and corporate governance are (and should be) about.
4
 Contractual theories 
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thus have a clear political slant, simultaneously legitimating, as both just and efficient, existing 
corporate structures and the priority that company law gives to the pursuit of the shareholder 
interest. As Douglas Branson says, they have an "overwhelmingly apologist flavor" and with 
their general presumption against the regulation of corporate affairs they "dovetail nicely with 
the wishes and desires of the titans of corporate America".
5
 They also, of course, contrast 
sharply with stakeholding theories which argue, in different ways, that the interests of a wide 
range of groups with "stakes" in public companies - employees, customers, creditors, the 
community at large - should be recognised and, in some cases, represented in corporate legal 
and managerial structures.  
 
 
Locating Corporations on the Public-Private Axis  
In large part because of their political and economic implications, and their neglect of issues of 
justice and equity, not to mention their rather impoverished conception of individual and social 
well-being, contractual theories of the corporation have been much criticised, particularly, but 
not exclusively, in the United States where they originated. As part of this process, a number of 
American scholars, most notably William Bratton and David Millon, have sought, among other 
things, to expose the political dimension of contractual theories by locating them historically, 
tracing their origins and situating them in relation to earlier theories of the corporation.
6
 The 
history that they recount is undoubtedly remarkably rich. For a variety of constitutional, 
jurisdictional and political reasons, corporations in the U.S. have since the early nineteenth 
century generated a range of legal problems whose resolution has demanded direct 
consideration of their nature and status. Compelled to grapple with questions about the nature of 
corporate "citizenship" and "personhood", American courts and lawyers, unlike their British 
counterparts, have found it impossible not to be drawn openly into essentialist debates about the 
nature of corporations. At first glance, the issues with which the courts became embroiled - such 
as whether corporations were artificial creations of the state or the "natural" products of private 
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initiative, and whether they were entities with a "real" existence quite independent from that of 
their members or simply aggregations of people - seem abstract and academic. However, 
underlying them - "operat[ing] at a deeper level", as David Millon puts it - has been the 
"abidingly crucial" political question of whether corporations are essentially public or private 
entities. Indeed, it is the different answers that have been offered to this question over time that 
has provided the general framework for the recent analyses of the development of American 
corporate theory, all of which are in their different ways concerned with plotting the relationship 
between different theories of the corporation and the shifting location of corporations on the 
public-private axis. The contrast, Millon explains, is "between a public law, regulatory 
conception of corporate law on the one hand, and a private law, internal perspective on the 
other"; between "a body of law concerned solely with the techniques of shareholder wealth-




 In general terms, the claim is that, historically, designations of corporations as artifical 
creations of the state have tended to be used to counter claims that they are overwhelmingly 
private in nature and to support a pro-regulation, public law approach to corporate law; while 
designations of them as the "natural" products of private contract have usually been used to 
justify an anti-regulatory stance. In a similar vein, it is argued that characterisations of 
corporations as aggregates of individuals have tended to be used to assert their fundamentally 
private, contractual nature and to legitimate shareholder primacy and state non-interventionism; 
while characterisations of them as autonomous entities in their own right have commonly been 
used to underpin claims as to their public nature and to advance a less shareholder-oriented 
conception of corporate enterprise. From this perspective, the current wrangles within corporate 
theory are simply the latest chapter in the "long history of ... tension between the public and 
private character of the corporation"
8
, with contractual theories representing the most recent 
attempt to accentuate and advance a private, shareholder-oriented conception of the corporation. 
They are, in Millon's words, "an elaborate justification for the now familiar view that corporate 
activity and corporate law are purely private matters" upon which public policy concerns should 
not be allowed to intrude; for the view that corporate law should concern itself only with the 
welfare and interests of shareholders. By emphasising the voluntary nature and market-like 
characteristics of corporations, contractual theory seeks to pull them to the private side of the 
public-private divide, bolstering shareholder primacy and diminishing the role of the state in 
corporate life. The corporation is reconstructed with few, if any, public elements, and 
"community values" are wrung from it.
9
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 In portraying the present as history and by emphasising the centrality to corporate theory 
of the public-private divide, this work has done much to cast light on the development not only 
of contractual theory, the ahistoricism of which makes it unusually vulnerable to historical 
analysis, but of corporate theory as a whole, revealing it to be not a steadily advancing body of 
knowledge but a long-standing site of ideological struggle. This paper argues, however, that 
while this work has provided many valuable insights, it does not fully get to grips with the 
issues which lie at the heart of company law and corporate theory: the constitution and 
allocation of rights over the assets and activities of joint stock companies. Not only does this 
issue precede that of efficiency, a concept which, as it is understood within orthodox economics, 
essentially presupposes both a pre-existing allocation of rights and that those rights take a 
particular (alienable) form
10
, it is central to understanding the historical development of 
corporate theory, for it is the reconceptualisation (and reallocation) of corporate property and 
corporate rights necessitated by the transformation of productive relations effected by the rise of 
the joint stock company that has been the driving force behind theoretical change in company 
law. In offering an alternative history of corporate theory, the paper argues that, historically, 
contractual theories of the corporation, with their emphasis on efficiency-based justifications, 
emerged as an attempt to defend and legitimate the rights and privileges of rentier shareholders 
in face of the increasing difficulties involved in characterising corporations as private property 
and shareholders as corporate "owners".
11
 Relying less on the fundamental moral principles 
traditionally associated with the ideas of private property and ownership (such as natural right, 
liberty, moral desert) and more on the alleged instrumental value of shareholder rights in 
contributing to productivity and efficiency, contractual theories of the corporation, it suggests, 
seek to give legitimacy to a legal status-quo in which corporations are run exclusively for the 
private benefit of shareholders despite their overwhelmingly social and public nature.
12
 Indeed, 
in recent years, it argues, as both the power and influence of financial capital and inequalities of 
wealth and income have grown, the new legitimations of shareholder rights provided by 
contractual theories have become ever more important. In reminding us of the crucial, but 
increasingly neglected, issues surrounding the constitution and allocation of rights in and over 
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corporations, the paper hopes to broaden the focus of the debates currently taking place about 
company law reform and to indicate the issues which need to be addressed if an "effective 
ethical framework for [corporate] governance"
13
 is to be constructed, a framework aimed more 
at meeting the material needs of society and enhancing the well-being of its members than at 
maximising the financial returns of rentier shareholders.  
 
 
From Owning Assets to Owning Companies: The Rise of Entity Theory 
What we now call "company law" began to emerge in the early-mid nineteenth century as "joint 
stock company law", the body of law applied to joint stock companies. Joint stock companies, 
although considered types of partnership even when incorporated, were distinguished from 
"ordinary" partnerships by their size, their separation of ownership from management and the 
transferability of their shares. In contemporary parlance, they were "public" rather than 
"ordinary" or "private" partnerships, to which the principles of the law of partnership, slightly 
modified, were thought generally applicable. Correspondingly, when the first book devoted to 
joint stock company law appeared in 1836 it was largely confined to explaining how the 
principles of the law of partnership had been modified in various ways for application to 
incorporated and unincorporated joint stock companies.
14
 Early company law, such as it was, 
was thus treated as an adjunct to the law of partnership.  
 These conceptions reflected the fact that, unlike their modern counterparts, early joint 
stock companies were still relatively small organisations whose shareholders often had a 
personal link of some kind to the companies in which they held shares and who, even if not 
directly involved in management itself, were commonly involved in its monitoring.
15
 And the 
fact that in the absence of a developed market in company securities, shares were not readily 
saleable assets and shareholders were, therefore, in a certain sense and to a certain extent, "tied" 
to the companies in which they held shares. The result was that, deep into the nineteenth 
century, both incorporated and unincorporated joint stock companies were conceptualised, like 
partnerships, as aggregates of people rather than, as they are now, as objects in their own right 
("things") autonomous from their shareholders. A company's shareholders were the company. 
This was reflected in the conceptualisation of the property of companies. Until the mid-
nineteenth century the joint stock company share was regarded in law as an equitable (and, 
therefore, direct proprietary) interest in a company's assets and shareholders as the equitable co-
owners of those assets.
16
 Indeed, although the rights of individual shareholders over the 
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corporate assets were inevitably diluted to accomodate joint property ownership, as a result of 
the collective power that they exercised through company general meetings  - and of the relative 
illiquidity of their shares - there were important senses in which shareholders really did 
resemble asset "owners" in something like the sense outlined by Honore in his celebrated essay 
on ownership.
17
   
 From the middle of the nineteenth century, however, in the wake of the development of 
the railway system and the proliferation of railway companies, joint stock companies 
increasingly became qualitatitively rather than merely quantitatively different from ordinary 
partnerships. Railway companies were not only much larger than their predecessors, both in 
terms of the size of their memberships and of the capital that they embodied, they were 
fundamentally impersonal organisations the great majority of whose shareholders in no way 
participated in management. The growing number of "detached" shareholders was both reflected 
in and further encouraged by the rapid emergence in the 1830's and 40's of a developed and 
active market in company securities. In a very short period of time, the nature of the 
shareholder, of shareholding and of the share itself as a form of property had all been 
transformed. Very soon, the great majority of joint stock company shareholders were 
functionless rentiers, "investors" who took little or no direct interest in the companies in which 
they held shares, other, of course, than in the dividends they paid.    
 There were many legal dimensions to these changes. Perhaps most importantly, the legal 
nature of the joint stock company share was transformed. With the development of a relatively 
sophisticated share market, shares became readily marketable, liquid commodities with a value 
of their own independent of (and often quite different from) the value of a company's concrete 
assets. As a result, they ceased to be regarded in law as equitable interests in the assets of 
companies and came instead to be seen as rights to profit. Shares emerged, in other words, as an 
intangible form of property in their own right quite independent of the assets of companies; no 
longer did they constitute a direct proprietary interest in those assets. In this process, 
shareholders themselves ceased to be seen as owners of assets - these were now owned by 
"companies", conceptualised not as shareholders merged but as reified entities in their own right 
- but as owners of shares, titles to revenue with a (capital) value determied by the share market. 
There were now two quite different, legally constituted, forms of property, one owned by 
shareholders (shares, titles to revenue), the other owned by companies (assets); and two fully 
separate and quite distinct legal subjects, companies and shareholders. These 
reconceptualisations provided the basis for the development in the U.K. of the modern doctrine 
of separate corporate personality, with its "complete separation" of company and members; and, 
somewhat later, of what came to be called in the U.S. the "entity theory" of the corporation.  
 The reduction of shareholders from the status of relatively active "co-partners", as they 
were commonly called in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to passive owners of 
titles to revenue, external to companies as productive units, was further reflected in the gradual 
transfer of power within joint stock companies from general meetings and shareholders to 
boards of directors and managers, a process in which shareholders gradually relinquished many 
of the the rights and powers traditionally associated with ownership. As a result of these and 
other developments related to the reduction of shareholders to the status of rentier investors 
external to the process of production, company law gradually diverged from the law of 
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partnership and had, by the late nineteenth century, separated out as a quite distinct body of law 
in its own right. In 1889, the author of the leading treatise in the area, Nathaniel Lindley, who 
had for many years subsumed his coverage of company law within his book on partnership, a 
volume revealingly entitled A Treatise on The Law of Partnership including its Application to 
Joint Stock and Other Companies, finally accorded company law a volume of its own.
18
  
 As the ideas of shareholders as owners of assets and as being the company were 
displaced, there emerged a new notion of shareholders as the owners of "the company", a reified 
entity external to them. This idea persists today. So far as large publicly quoted companies were 
concerned, however, this idea had little basis in law, for while shareholders clearly exercised 
ownership rights over their shares, in relation to companies and their assets they possessed 
progressively fewer of Honore's incidents of ownership.
19
 On the contrary, in exchange for 
limited liability (and an easy life), they had given up virtually all of the rights traditionally 
associated with ownership either of the corporation or its assets: the right to operate and 
manage; the right to sell, dispose, pledge, encumber, or hypothecate; the right to create lesser 
titles in interests, such as leases, licenses, easements of covenants; the right to bequeath.
20
 This 
prompted Merrick Dodd to distinguish the "technical" legal position - that "the corporation and 
not the shareholders is the owner of the corporate assets" - from the "lawyer's theory" and the 
"business man's tradition" - that "the corporation owns the business [and] the shareholders in 
turn own the corporation".
21
 The ownership myth
22
, however, served one very useful purpose. 
With its Blackstonian implication of absolute sovereignty, of "sole and despotic dominium"
23
, 
of exclusive and exclusionary "mineness", the idea that shareholders "owned" corporations, that 
corporations were their private property, suggested that the retention by functionless 
shareholders of their right to profit and to appoint and dismiss directors were underlain by the 
fundamental moral principles of natural right, liberty and moral desert; that the validity of these 
rights was free-standing and independent of their impact on, and consequences for, such things 
as productive efficiency and the distribution of wealth. In other words, the ownership myth pre-
empted any proper analysis of the crucial question of what the rights and privileges of these 
                                                 
    
18
 The first edition of Lindley's treatise on partnership was published in 1860 (by William 
Maxwell). It had been through five editions before the separate volume on company law 
appeared.  
    
19
 See Paddy Ireland, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62 
Modern Law Review 32. 
    
20
 See Peter Rona, letter, 89 Harvard Business Review (Nov-Dec 1989) 198. 
    
21
 E. Merrick Dodd, "The Modern Corporation, Private Property and Recent Federal 
Legislation" (1941) 54 Harvard Law Review 917 at 918. 
    
22
 See Ireland n.19. Although the idea still persists that shareholders (including the 
shareholders of large public companies) `own' companies by virtue of their ownership of shares, 
lawyers have always found it next to impossible to give coherent legal substance to it. Hence the 
difficulty they have in defining the legal nature of shares and indicating how they constitute a 
proprietary interest in the company. 
    
23




rentier shareholders should be. 
 
 
Radical Entity Theory and the Question of Corporate Ownership  
In the first half of the twentieth century, however, this was precisely the question that many 
began to ask. As the externality of shareholders from production and management, and their 
lack of purpose became ever more apparent - and by this time the great majority of shareholders 
had not only ceased to contribute to management but to be significant sources of new capital for 
companies - the ideas that shareholders were corporate "owners" and that corporations were 
their private property came increasingly to be challenged.  
 In the U.S., in particular, there was growing recognition that the rise of the modern 
corporation had contributed to fundamental changes in the nature of property and property 
rights. Thorstein Veblen, for example, argued that ownership, which had previously entailed the 
control of tangible material assets and carried with it various duties and responsibilities, had 
come with the rise of the modern joint stock corporation to entail mere passive possession of 
intangible corporate capital. Corporate shareholders, he argued, had been reduced to the status 
of "anonymous pensioners" detached from the process of production; they were "absentee 
owners" possessing claims "to unearned or free income", "prescriptive rights to get something 
for nothing". He accordingly likened them to corporate bondholders, arguing that the lines 
between debt and property, credit and capital, and stock and bond were becoming increasingly 
blurred.
24
 By the late 1920's, it had become commonplace to remark on the resemblance 
between shareholders and bondholders, thereby implicitly questioning the former's proprietary 
status vis-a-vis the corporation. "The average stockholder in the large corporation", wrote 
Franklin Wood, "regards himself more as a security holder than as in any sense a responsible 
managing partner in the corporate enterprise". As a result, he argued, the legal distinction 




 Ideas of this sort provided the basis for the radical reinterpretation of entity theory 
offered by E. Merrick Dodd in the early 1930s's in his celebrated exchange with Adolf Berle.
26
 
Concerned about the growing unaccountability of many American corporate managers, Berle 
had some years earlier argued for a strenghtening and tightening of the fiduciary duties 
compelling them to pursue the shareholder interest. He did so not so much for reasons of 
principle but because he could see no other way of preventing managers from feathering their 
own nests and making them accountable to someone.
27
 Dodd responded by contesting the close 
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identification of corporations with their shareholders that this entailed, arguing that important 
changes were taking place in "public opinion" of the corporation in which society saw business 
not as a purely private enterprise but as something with wider social obligations. Some 
corporate managers, he argued, had responded by accepting that they had "social 
responsibilities" and the judiciary were showing tolerance towards the resulting changes in 
managerial orientation, notwithstanding the traditional view that charity had no business to sit at 
boards of directors. Crucially, according to Dodd, while such an extended view of corporate 
managerial social responsibility was "difficult to justify if [one] insist[ed] on thinking of the 
business corporation as merely an aggregate of stockholders...", it could easily be reconciled 
with a view of the corporation as a real entity, "as an institution which differs in the nature of 
things from the individuals who compose it". Once one recognised the corporation as a truly 
separate "person", he suggested, there was no reason why it should not operate, through its 
managerial agents, as a "good citizen ... with a sense of social responsibility". In short, Dodd 
used entity theory to provide a theoretical basis for the idea of the corporation as a partially, if 
not predominantly, public institution with broad social responsibilties.
28
  
 By the time of the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property in late 
1932 Berle's own position had begun to shift. The rise of the modern corporation, he argued 
with Gardiner Means, "involved an essential alteration in the character of property", giving rise 
to important questions about both the orientation of the "great public" corporations and the 
allocation of rights in them. Because shareholders were now the owners of "passive" rather than 
of "active" property, the "traditional logic of property" no longer applicable to them. Having 
relinquished so many of the rights traditionally associated with ownership, they could no longer 
properly, or accurately, be called the corporation's owners. They had "surrendered the right that 
the corporation should be operated in their sole interest", "releas[ing] the community from the 
obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights". The 
community was entitled "to demand that the modern corporation serve ... all society". Various 
groups should be "assign[ed] ... a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy 
rather than private cupidity".
29
 
 After the second world war, as many commentators came to question the belief that 
shareholders were corporate owners in the traditional sense of the word, sentiments of this sort 
became quite commonplace. There was, however, considerable disagreement as to how 
shareholders should be reconceived and, consequently, as to how corporations should be viewed 
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and treated. Some began to designate shareholders "investors" rather than "owners", but 
continued nevertheless to treat their position as one akin to ownership and their rights as akin to 
private property rights over the corporation and its assets. They thus defended and promoted 
shareholder corporate primacy, though seeking to secure the interests of shareholders by means 
of investor protection rather than by means of measures aimed at rekindling shareholder 
participation.
30
 For others, however, the recognition that shareholders were "investors" rather 
than "owners" highlighted their resemblance to creditors and the weakness of their proprietary 
claims over the corporation itself. As Edward Mason explained in The Corporation in Modern 
Society, an influential collection of essays published in 1959, with the "equity holder ... joining 
the bond holder as a functionless rentier" and having "only the vaguest idea where `his property' 
is or of what it entails", "the traditional justifications .. of private enterprise [and] of private 
property [had] gone forever". The old Lockean and Jeffersonian arguments that private property 
ownership was essential to the "full development of personality, to the maintenance of 
individual freedom .... and to the formation of a citizenry capable of self-government" might 
still be valid in relation to "individual possessory holdings" but were increasingly irrelevant to 
corporations whose "owners" had been converted into rentiers.
31
  
 This perceived erosion of the legitimacy of shareholder corporate rights and primacy 
was manifested in various ways. In the U.S., a number of commentators - among them Abram 
Chayes, Bayless Manning and Peter Drucker
32
 - argued that shareholder voting rights should be 
pared down or even rescinded. Others called for a wider conception of corporate "membership" 
which would embrace, in particular, employees. In Britain, LCB Gower, doyen of post-war 
British company law, asked whether it was "not time to recognize that shareholder democracy, 
with its exclusive emphasis on the profit-making element in corporate activity, has a slightly old 
fashioned ring?".
33
 And a little later, George Goyder called for company law reform aimed at 
creating "participating" and "responsible" companies, membership of which would be extended 
not only to shareholders but to employees, consumers and the community. He recognised that 
this required what he called "a certain subordination of the shareholders interest", but, likening 
them variously to money-lenders, investors, creditors and even userers - anything but owners - 
Goyder argued that their legitimate claims over corporations and corporate income were limited. 
They were entitled, at most, to a fair return on their investment though not necessarily to a 
perpetual return; perhaps, he suggested, shares should be compulsorily amortized.
34
 A few years 
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later, K.W. (later Lord) Wedderburn, lamenting the lack of radicalism of the Jenkins Committee 
report, similarly argued that there was "no reason not to equate [the shareholder's] position with 
that of a well secured creditor" and that company law "should not treat the shareholder's as a 
`proprietor' entitled to control".
35
 
 Paradoxically, one of the reasons why the political pressure for a reduction in the legal 
rights of shareholders waned was because the issue was thought redundant by many on the left 
precisely because the de facto power of shareholders had been emasculated by their dispersal, 
their rentier nature, and their loss of rights within the company. Indeed, by the 1950's many 
commentators were arguing that the declining power of private property and of corporate 
shareholders in particular had altered the nature of capitalism itself. In the U.S., Berle began 
referring to the modern American business system as one of "People's Capitalism" or 
"Collectivism"
36
, while J.K.Galbraith talked of shareholders as vestigial, of the subservience of 
the corporation to society and the state, and of the supersession of the market.
37
 This was 
echoed in Britain by writers such as Anthony Crosland. Managers now controlled large 
corporations, Crosland argued, and "independent not only of the firm's own shareholders, but 
increasingly of the capitalist or property owning class as a whole", they balanced the interests of 
shareholders with those of employees, customers and the community at large. For Crosland, so 
significant were the differences in "the nature of the profit-goal and the degree of responsibility 
with which economic power is exercised", "present day society" had to be distinguished from 
capitalism, whose traditional ruthlessness and aggressive individualism had been replaced by "a 
suave and sophisticated sociability". Correspondingly, the pattern of ownership of industry - 
whether it was nationalised or privately owned - was now largely irrelevant, for it did not 
determine the extent to which socially responsible goals were pursued.  Large corporations, 
Crosland argued, "acted in fundamentally the same way, whether publicly or privately owned". 
Using "a historical definition", he concluded, it was "manifestly inaccurate" to call 





Henry Manne and the Reprivatization of the Corporation  
By this time, then, not only was the idea of shareholder corporate "ownership" under question, 
the old, traditional, ownership and private property based justifications for the rights and 
privileges of shareholders were becoming progressively less persuasive. It is in this context that 
the rise of contractual theories of the corporation need to be viewed. In this respect, the work of 
those most frequently associated with contractarian theory - Alchian and Demsetz, Jensen and 
Meckling, Easterbrook and Fischel - is in many ways less revealing than the work of Henry 
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Manne, one of the founding fathers of law and economics.  
 It is clear that by as early as the mid 1950's Manne was concerned with the threat posed 
by contemporary thinking on the corporation, which he traced back to Berle and Means, both to 
shareholder rights and to the capitalist market economy as a whole. He blanched at suggestions 
that shareholders should receive only a "fair" return on their capital and that the interests of 
groups other than shareholders should be considered by managers. The movement for corporate 
social responsibility, he argued, was undermining market mechanisms, raising the suspicion that 
a "radically altered form of economy [was] being proposed" in which "the ideal of the market as 
a resource allocator ... [was being] abandoned". As a result of this politicisation of the economic 
sphere, he later wrote, we were entering "a new phase of concern" with the "political position" 
of the large corporation and with "the role it is and should be playing in the distribution and 
enjoyment of a great variety of the values in which the community is interested".
39
  
 Manne responded to the threat by arguing that, notwithstanding growing industrial 
concentration, market disciplines were still operative, preventing corporations from straying too 
far from their traditional, profit-making goal. It was, however, on capital, rather than on product, 
markets that Manne placed disciplinary reliance. The idea that capital markets might constrain 
corporate managers was not new
40
, but most of those seeking to protect the interests of 
shareholders still looked to a restoration of participative shareholder democracy as the route 
forward
41
, drawing encouragement from the emergence in post-war America of a small group of 
shareholder activists who occasionally forced proxy battles for the control of corporations.
42
 As 
a result, there was still a tendency to regard the sale of shares by shareholders as not only "the 
weakest of all the tools in the hands of the stockholder" but as "a disloyal kind of activity which 
[was] really not desirable".
43
 Manne sought to turn this view on its head. If done on a large 
enough scale, he argued, the sale of shares by dissatisfied shareholders could depress a 
corporation's share price, rendering the corporation vulnerable to take-over and its poorly 
performing managers vulnerable to removal. Although proxy fights were rare, the mere threat of 
"a raid" would often suffice, for the constant pressure of possible take-over "condition[ed] 
managers to a specific point of view perfectly consistent with the shareholders' interest, .., 
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keeping the price of the company's shares as high as possible".
44
 In this context, the rise of the 
institutional investor - by 1960, institutional investors owned 17.2% of the value of U.S. 
shares
45
 - was, Manne argued, "one of the most dramatic and important events in the recent 
history of market finance", for what corporate management feared most was that the institution 
would sell its shares with a potentially disastrous effect on their market price.
46
 Manne thus 
attempted to transform the externalisation of the rentier shareholder from the corporation - an 
externalisation in many ways accentuated by the rise of financial intermediaries such as 
institutional investors - from a vice, which arguably undermined not only shareholder control 
but the legitimacy of their residual rights, into a positive virtue. The very lack of commitment of 
shareholders to the corporation and their very readiness to "exit", he suggested, heightened the 
threat to "errant managements" who dared deviate from the gospel of profit-maximisation. "The 
fight for control" was, in his view, "a mechanism by which the market operates to weed out the 
inefficient and less productive".
47
 By the mid 60's, he had further developed this argument and 
was claiming not only that an "active market for corporate control" existed and that a "great 
many mergers [were] probably the result of [its] successful workings"
48
 but that the market for 
corporate control held the key to "true corporate democracy". Accordingly, he was highly 
critical of those calling for the dilution or removal of shareholder voting rights, not because he 
believed that these rights would (or could) be used by shareholders to restore participative 
democracy to corporations, but because the market for corporate control could only function to 
ensure "a rational allocation" of capital and managerial services
49
 where shares carrying votes 
could be bought and sold.
50
 Indeed, it was because of its alleged contribution to the proper 
working of this market that Manne defended insider dealing, arguing that it not only tied the 
interests of corporate managers more closely to those of shareholders, but helped to ensure that 
the price of a company's securities reflected its performance and the relative efficiency of its 
management. By trading in a company's shares, knowledgable insiders were, in effect, 
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constantly "correcting" the company's share price.
51
 Crucially, in making these arguments, 
Manne began to develop justifications for shareholder rights which relied less on the moral 
force of their claims as corporate "owners", and much more on the instrumental value of their 
rights in ensuring "allocative efficiency". Rather than attempting to defend their ownership 
claims and lamenting their detachment from corporations, Manne insisted that shareholders had 
never performed the traditional functions of ownership
52
 but had, on the contrary, always been 
mere "investors", the "traditional capital investor[s] of economic theory" who put "money at risk 
for use by entrepreneurs and managers". They had, moreover, according to Manne, always been 
recognised as such by company law. What needed to be explained wasn't so much the 
contemporary lack of rights of shareholders - this flowed from their status as investors - but the 
more extensive corporate rights that they had possessed in the nineteenth century.
53
  
 In its static ahistoricism, Manne's account of the nature of corporate shareholding 
prefigured contractarian and agency theories of the company, propelling him not only into 
unpersuasive and inelegant historical distortions as he tried to explain away the earlier 
partnership (and "ownership") based rules of company law
54
, but into confused and confusing 
assertions about the nature of the shareholder's property and property rights. He described, for 
example, the claims made by Berle and Means about the passive nature of the share and about 
the fundamentally social nature of the large corporation - claims which posed a threat to 
shareholder primacy - as based on "erroneous assumptions about the nature of property". They 
had wrongly assumed that the notion of private property necessarily involved "both the concept 
of risk assumption and that of control or use of the property", and that "the economic reward 
provided to property owners is justified only if they perform both of these functions", 
mistakenly concluding on this basis that the return to shareholders, as "risk takers only", should 
be limited. In fact, Manne argued, the only essential characteristic of a private property system 
was that owners "assumed the risk of a rise or fall in the market value of [their] property". An 
owner was not bound to use his property at all and was perfectly entitled to delegate control 
over it to managerial agents.
55
  
 Lacking a dynamic historical conception of capitalism, Manne was utterly unable to 
grasp that Berle and Means had simply been trying to address the practical and ethical problems 
thrown up by the changing nature of corporations, corporate property and corporate 
shareholding; and, in particular, by the transformation of the shareholder into a functionless, 
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passive investor (a money capitalist) external to the corporation. He could not see that the nature 
of both shareholding and ideas and forms of property were subject to change. This was 
something of a paradox, for it was, of course, precisely the historical changes which had 
occurred in the economic and legal nature of the share which provided the foundation of 
Manne's own analysis, with its emphasis on the importance of the liquidity and alienability of 
the shareholder's property to the proper functioning of the market for corporate control. In his 
attacks on Berle, Manne simply confused and conflated the two property forms which had 
emerged, sometimes identifying the shareholders' property with the corporation's assets, 
sometimes with its shares. In short, while he was very keen to embrace the modern conception 
of shareholders as mere "investors", he was quite unwilling to confront the implications of this 
historic change in status for the nature and ethical defensibility of their corporate rights.  
 Manne's distortions did not go unnoticed or unchallenged, however. When he attacked 
managerialist theories which suggested that corporations were no longer subject to rigourous 
market disciplines - theories which he traced to Berle and Means and which he believed, had 
precipitated the worrying "newer concern with political values" - Berle re-entered the fray. In 
trying to place the modern corporation' within an essentially nineteenth century theory of 
economics, he argued, Manne had been forced into "redescriptions" which simply did "not fit 
the facts". Berle ridiculed Manne's "wholly imaginery" account of the proxy fight and the 
market for corporate control ("mere misdescription"); questioned the extent to which 
managements were bound by the capital market ("there is some truth in this - but not much"); 
and lampooned Manne's account of the role and value of the corporate shareholder. Manne 
simply refused, Berle argued, to face up to the difficulties involved in specifying the precise 
nature of the modern shareholder's "property" and, consequently, in justifying continuing 
shareholder corporate primacy. His claim that shareholders were "investors" was also, Berle 
added, in certain important respects a distortion of reality which flattered the rentier, for it was 
"pure fiction" to suggest that modern shareholders "invested in" companies in the sense of 
providing them with capital or supplying them with funds. While the original purchaser of the 
company's shares was "a genuine investor" who provided the company with money, this was 
hardly true of the modern purchaser of corporate shares who simply bought shares issued long 
ago from others who had done likewise. "When I buy AT&T or General Motors", Berle 
remarked, "I do not remotely `invest in' either concern". This claim was mere "folklore habit", 
part of an "unreal" attempt to describe late twentieth century processes institutions, and relations 
in traditional nineteenth century terms. He reiterated the conclusions he had reached thirty years 
earlier with Gardiner Means: "traditional theories of property no longer applied to the relation of 
stockholders in large corporations" and the "applicable logic would become increasingly social". 
Passive property certainly needed "new philosophical [and] economic bases", he argued, but 
they were not be found "in terms of `investment' or `capital markets'".
56
 It was a withering 
riposte, but while Berle was not much longer for this earth, Manne and his intellectual 
counterparts were about to inherit it. 
 
 
Governance and the Growing Power of Finance  
While Berle derided Manne's theories, many economists began to see them as marking a path 
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whereby corporations could be brought back within orthodox economic analysis. For many 
years, companies had been treated within neo-classical economics as unproblematic conflict-
free, profit-maximising, productive "black boxes". Not even growing oligopolisation, nor 
Coase's famous 1937 article on "the nature of the firm", with its mildly subversive suggestion 
that firms entailed the supercession of the price mechanism by administrative decision
57
, had 
dented this view. Indeed, Coase's work had been largely ignored, and, in the wake of Berle and 
Means, theories of the corporation (such as they were) tended to be managerialist and non-
market in nature. This began to change in the late 1960's. In what turned out to be a pivotal 
moment, Manne co-ordinated a symposium on securities legislation and economic policy. The 
contributors included the economists Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, 
William Meckling and Oliver Williamson, as well as lawyers such as Bayless Manning and 
Wilbur Katz. The principle purpose of the symposium, as Manne explained, was to "bring the 
techniques of economics to bear on a broad spectrum of securities regulation problems", 
including capital allocation theory and the theory of the firm - issues which the economists 
involved readily admitted they had neglected.
58
  
 As a foretaste of the future, most revealing, perhaps, were the contrasting contributions 
of Williamson and Alchian. Examining the efficacy of the various markets described by Manne 
and others, Williamson concluded that while they operated so as to constrain managerial 
discretion, they did not entirely eliminate it. As a result, managerial approaches to the firm still 
"ha[d] something to be said in their behalf" and it was therefore necessary to "supplement" neo-
classical theory with organisational theory to get "to grips with some of the bureaucratic realities 
of large organisations".
59
 Significantly, it was from around this time that the influence of 
Coase's work and the transaction cost approach to the firm finally began to grow, becoming one 
of the central pillars upon which was built the "new institutional economics" in whose 
development Williamson played a leading role.
60
 By contrast, Alchian argued that as long as 
there was no interference with the ability to make profits or with the ability freely to capitalise 
and to sell corporate property rights, the operation of the market would ensure efficient 
organisational forms. "In reality", he argued "the firm is a surrogate of the marketplace", from 
which he concluded that the traditional theory of profits, of private property, market, and 
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competition was far from obsolete.
61
  
 Alchian's contribution was particularly warmly welcomed by Wilbur Katz, one of the 
lawyers present. Recanting what he called his "adolescent" attachment to the work of Thorstein 
Veblen, R.H. Tawney and Berle and Means, Katz argued that law teachers (but not, thankfully, 
economists) had been corrupted by "the literature that stem[med] from Berle and Means and the 
managerialists". He was "shocked" by the kind of suggestions made by Merrick Dodd (that the 
legal duty of directors to manage in the interests of shareholders on a profit-maximising basis 
should be relaxed), and, more recently, by Abram Chayes (that there was no reason why 
shareholders should have votes) and Bayless Manning (that maybe shareholders should not be 
allowed to vote until they had held their shares for longer than a certain period). In relation to 
corporate theory and shareholder rights, Katz argued, there was a need for "more theology", not 
less as Manning had suggested. What was required above all else was "mutual understanding on 
basic questions of policy and value", "a discarding of ... reticences and a sharing of basic 
convictions with respect to [the] good society". He therefore welcomed the "crypto-theology" he 
detected in Alchian's paper, but felt that it would be better if we could be "less cryptic"; if 




 The lack of empirical support for Alchian's emerging theology did not go unnoticed. 
Alchian, remarked one respondent, "very cleverly ... refuses to do empirical work".
63
 Very soon, 
however, the empirical validity or otherwise of the various claims being made about the 
operation of the stock market became secondary to their ideological usefulness, for it was from 
around this time that the long post-war boom came to an end and that the power of finance and 
of rentier investors began significantly to grow.
64
 This precipitated the demise of managerialism 
and, in Britain, sounded a death knell to meaningful plans for worker participation. By the 
1980's, the influence of the financial sphere had become greater than at any time since the 
1920's and the corporate world which was emerging bore little resemblance to that described by 
Galbraith, Berle and others during the long post-war boom. For many, the takeovers and 
divestitures of the 1980's marked the final reversal of the trend towards managerial "non-
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shareholder-wealth-maximising behaviour" that had developed in the post-war period.
65
 Indeed, 
the influence of finance now extends well beyond the governance of large corporations and goes 
to the very heart of government policy, most notably in promoting tight monetary and fiscal 
policies aimed at controlling inflation and boosting the prices of financial assets. By the early-
mid 1990's, it was quite clear, if it hadn't been before, that the post-war "Golden Age" - of social 
democracy, of expanding welfare states, of managerialism, of Berle's "People's Capitalism" - 
had come to an abrupt end. 
 In form, the influence now exerted by the financial sphere and its rentiers over Anglo-
American corporations differs from that of earlier periods. The direct control by banks which 
was so marked in the U.S. in the early decades of the century, for example, has gone, banned in 
the U.S by the financial reforms of the 1930's. What we have instead seen is the rise and fall of 
devices such as the leveraged buyout (LBO) and, more recently and ubiquitously, the gradual 
growth - prompted in the U.S. and the U.K., in particular, by the increasing power of 
institutional investors - of what has come to be called "shareholder activism". It is not 
insignificant that the principle academic champion of the LBO has been Michael Jensen, one of 
the founding fathers of contractual theory. In the 1970's Jensen began writing about the 
problems created by the divergence of interest between shareholders and managers, the so-
called principal-agent problem. Initially, his favoured solution was the extensive use of share 
options as part of executive pay so as to realign the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders.
66
 By 1983, however, he was changing his mind, celebrating the market for 
corporate control as a market in which "alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to 
manage corporate resources".
67
 Pursuing this, he had by the end of the decade become a leading 
advocate of the leveraged buyout, which he championed, somewhat prematurely as it turned out, 
as the new corporate form.
68
 By the late 1980's, the idea of the "liquid" market for corporate 
control was ever more celebrated in the popular and academic literature, peaking during the 
leverage boom of 1989. The difference was that while the buyers in Manne's market for 
corporate control had been corporations, hence his focus on "mergers", the buyers in the late 
80's were financiers, bankers and dealmakers such as the LBO boutique Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts
69
, rather than firms in related industries, hence the emphasis on the "liquidity" of the 
market. The era of the LBO proved shortlived, however, and after various buyouts suffered 
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financial distress, the fashion for them waned, to be replaced by rentier assertiveness in the form 
of "shareholder activism" by institutional investors. This remains the dominant contemporary 
form.  
 The beginnings of a marked and sustained departure from the previously well-
established passivity of institutional investors can be traced back to the 80's, by which time not 
only had the proportion of shares held held by institutions, particularly in the U.S. and U.K., 
scaled new heights, the competition between and within institutions had begun significantly to 
increase. Since then, with money managers increasingly judged on their quarterly performances, 
corporate managers have been confronted by an activism whose whole point is "to increase the 
profit share of national income, and to claim a larger proportion of that profit share for rentiers". 
As Henwood says, shareholders today "are far less passive, boards less rubber-stampish, and 
managements less autonomous than at any time since Berle and Means".
70
 While direct 
intervention in corporations by institutional investors remains relatively rare, the enormous 
impact that their monitoring and cajoling has had on corporate managerial culture in the U.S. 
and beyond cannot be doubted. In recent years, it has become increasingly de rigueur for 
corporate managers, faced by increased pressure from demanding rentiers, to pay homage to the 
God of "shareholder value".
71
 It is not insignificant or surprising, therefore, that one of the two 
possible models for company law identified in the consultation paper of the UK Company Law 
Reform Steering Group is explicitly based around precisely this idea. Correspondingly, as the 
90's have progressed, bringing with them a period of ruthless labour exploitation, downsizing, 
investment cutbacks and rentier greed, the efficiency-based justifications that contractarian and 
agency theories of the corporation offer for shareholder rights have become not only ever more 
welcome but ever more necessary. If Manne's work in the 50's and 60's made the 
"marketisation" of the corporation and its return to orthodox economic analysis theoretically 
imaginable, the growing power of the rentier and of finance in recent years has made it 
ideologically indispensable.  
 
 
A Priori Efficiency and the Contractualisation of the Corporation 
It is far from clear even now, thirty years after Manne first posited its existence, whether the 
market for corporate control operates so as to weed out inefficient managers in anything like the 
way advertised. On the contrary, the historical record suggests that mergers and acquisitions 
often bring little in the way of efficiency gains. "There is", the authors of one study typically 
conclude, "no broad-guaged support for the `inefficient management displacement' hypothesis 
that acquired companies [are] subnormal performers" and the evidence "mandates considerable 
skepticism toward the claim that mergers are on average efficiency enhancing".
72
 This view has 
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broadly been endorsed by other studies.
73
 In Britain, for example, Julian Franks and Colin 
Mayer, observing that the performance of targets of hostile takeovers in the UK is close to that 
of the average quoted company, conclude that the results of the research that has been carried 
out questions the common association of markets for corporate control with the correction of 
managerial failure.
74
 There is, moreover, evidence that even when where the market for 
corporate control does contribute to the disciplining of poorly performing companies, its overall 




 The empirical validity (or otherwise) of the theories associated with the market have, 
however, become increasingly less important as their ideological value has grown. Thus, despite 
the doubts about the way in which the stock market actually operates, the claims made for its 
contribution to economic efficiency are nevertheless "among the least restrained to be found in 
agency theory".
76
 Whatever the reality, the alleged existence and efficacy of the market for 
corporate control and of a close correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the 
market price of the corporation's shares has become one of the theory's bedrocks. As David 
Campbell explains, the significance of Manne's "discovery" of the market for corporate control 
lay in its suggestion that corporate managers were subject to market disciplines and that it was, 
therefore, possible to construct a market-based theory of the firm to rival the non-market based 
theories spawned by managerialism. The idea of the properly functioning market for corporate 
control is "the fundamental concept of agency theory" precisely because, theoretically at least, it 
"places [the managerially controlled company] back under the market".
77
  
 That contractual or agency theories of the corporation are able to offer neo-classical 
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economists a solution to the problems generated by the ostensibly non-market nature of firms, 
enabling them to assert the efficiency of existing corporate structures, is also due in significant 
part, however, to the peculiar nature of their concept of "efficiency". Within orthodox economic 
theory, no attempt is made to evaluate the importance of the goal of efficiency relative to other 
competing goals; and the efficiency, or otherwise, of different arrangements and resource 
allocations is assessed not by careful, wide-ranging, empirical comparison, but by reference only 
to the formal nature of the arrangments and to the processes of which they are a product. Put 
simply, if the arrangements can be presented as the product of a process of free market 
exchange, they are deemed, a priori, to be "efficient".
78
 As John Parkinson says, once it has 
been presumed that a governance structure is the product of contracting, "it follows that it must 
be efficient".
79
 Spurred on by the "discovery" of the markets for corporate control and for 
managers themselves, contractual theorists made precisely that presumption, leaving their only 
remaining task that of identifying and elaborating the "contracts" involved. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that they have engaged in endless contortions purporting to show that 
existing corporate arrangements are, indeed, essentially the products of free market contractual 
exchanges. Discovering "contracts" in every conceivable corporate nook and cranny, they have 
generated in Biblical proportions the theology for which Katz called. With the irritating 
constraints imposed by empirical reality lifted, it is equally unsurprising that this 
contractualisation of the corporation has produced very varied accounts of the "contracts" 
constituting the corporation. Once one leaves the real world and enters a realm of theoretical 
fantasy, the possibilities are - within the contractual bounds set, of course - almost endless. 
Indeed, many of those sympathetic to stakeholding are now joining in, cheerfully trying to 
fabricate corporate "contracts" that are more favourable to employees and other stakeholders.
80
 
As David Campbell says, because the goal is simply "to bring the company within the theory", 
"real" contracts are placed on the same ontological plane as "unreal" (but theoretically 
necessary) contracts, contracts that, in empirical reality, simply do not exist.
81
 As a result, 
despite its claims to tough, hard-nosed realism, contractual theory is, in fact, strikingly 
unrealistic and empirically inaccurate.
82
 Hence Campbell's conclusion that, although it describes 
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the company as a nexus of contracts, there are, in fact, "no contracts .... only a nexus of 
metaphors". It "is not an empirically based theory" at all, but rather "carried by metaphor and 
assertion based on that metaphor", as a result of which it is "not readily open to rational 
debate".
83
 Indeed, according to Alan Wolfe, "even as metaphor, the notion of the firm as a nexus 
of contracts has problems".
84
 However, for all the metaphorical differences between the various 
contractual theories that have emerged, in one important and crucial respect they are more or 
less indistinguishable: they all conclude that the retention by shareholders of their residual 
income and control rights is legitimate and justifiable, not so much on grounds of shareholder 
corporate "ownership" but on grounds of efficiency. As Parkinson observes, the central purpose 
of nexus-of-contracts theorising has been "to establish that the large publicly owned company ... 
is efficient, notwithstanding the wide dispersal of shareholdings"
85
; or, to put it another way, to 
reprivatize the public company.  
 
 
Agency Theory and the Problem of Ownership  
The question of ownership is not, however, one that contractual theorists find easy to escape. 
Contractual theory generally tries to circumvent it and to avoid questions concerning the initial 
allocation of corporate (property) rights by conceptualising the corporation or "firm" out of 
existence. Viewed as a nexus of contracts, the corporation is deemed to be, in Jensen and 
Meckling's words, "just a legal fiction which serves as a focus for the complex process in which 
the conflicting objectives of individuals ... are brought in equilibrium within a framework of 
contractual relationship".
86
 With the corporation diminished in this way, there is within agency 
theory a tendency to see nothing (no "thing") to be owned. Corporate governance is thus treated 
as little more than a more complex version of standard contractual governance and shareholders 
once again characterised, as they were by Manne in his exchanges with Berle, as the owners and 
providers of "capital", one of the factors of production, rather than as the redundant, functionless 
rentiers, the buyers and sellers of titles to revenue, which in empirical reality they now are. The 
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kinds of questions that agency theorists pose reflect this mythology, presuming that shareholders 
actually give something to corporations, rather than simply place bets on their future 
profitability. "How does it happen", Jensen and Meckling innocently ask, "that millions of 
individuals are willing to turn over a significant fraction of their wealth to organisations run by 
managers who have so little interest in their welfare?". Or as Kenneth Scott puts it, "why are 
shareholders" - who "furnish inputs into the business" - "willing turn large sums of money over 
to other people (managers) on very ill-defined terms?".
87
 Reinvigorated in this way, 
shareholders are subtly returned to former glories: no longer redundant traders in titles to 
revenue, they are re-elevated to their earlier, more exalted status of "real" investors, restored to 
an entrepreneurial function as risk-taking "providers of capital". The reality that the 




 Once again, this recharacterisation - or "misdescription" - of the shareholder and the 
corporation elides the distinction between the corporate assets and shares. The two distinctive 
and autonomous property forms which emerged with the development of the modern joint stock 
corporation and the reduction of the shareholder to the status of a pure rentier completely 
external to the company are conflated under the rubric "capital", a process which discretely re-
unites the shareholder with the corporate assets. The curious effect of this is to eliminate the 
corporate entity as an owner of property, other than in a purely formal sense. Indeed, with 
shareholders characterised as the providers of capital, and with assets and shares conflated, the 
corporation more or less disappears, reduced to a mere cipher through which the owners of 
different factors of production are brought contractually together. The corporation, writes 
Eugene Fama, is "just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs 
and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs".
89
 While the various factors of 
production employed in a firm must be owned by someone, he explains, "ownership of capital 
should not be confused with ownership of the firm", for "ownership of the firm is an irrelevant 
concept".
90
 The conceptual elimination of the corporation not only places shareholders in direct 
touch with the corporate assets (the "capital"), it also places them, in theory at least, in direct 
touch with corporate managers, for with no corporate entity of substance to come between them, 
the relationship between shareholders and managers is correspondingly characterised as a pure 
agency relationship. Corporate governance tends in consequence to be seen as involving not 
highly complex questions of productive organisation, social well-being and social justice, but 
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simply the difficulties facing shareholder-principals trying to negotiate sufficiently binding 
contracts with agent-managers. Curiously, therefore, agency theory tries in many ways to turn 
the corporate-theoretical clock back to the early nineteenth century when the corporation was 
conceptualised as a purely artifical, fictional entity, harking back to the days when corporation 
and shareholders were perceived, for most purposes, as one and the same; when the 
shareholders were the corporation. Politically attractive though it is to defenders of rentier rights 
and corporate non-interventionism, however, the wholesale contractualisation of the firm is 
itself the source of a variety of conceptual problems.  
 Most importantly, perhaps, one of the effects of the reduction of the corporation to a 
nexus of contracts is that, in accordance with neo-classical ideology about the nature of markets, 
it tends to flatten the hierarchical elements within corporations, suggesting that they lack any in-
built structure of authority. Alchian and Demsetz, for example, recognise that it is "common to 
see the firm as characterised by the power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary 
action superior to that available in the conventional market", but argue that this is a "delusion". 
As "a highly specialized surrogate market", they insist, the firm "has no power of fiat, no 
authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market 
contracting". To speak of the management or direction of workers is merely "a deceptive way of 
noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of contracts on terms that must 
be acceptable to both parties". In fact, they reiterate, "authoritarian, dictational, or fiat attributes" 
are simply "not relevant to the conception of the firm or its efficiency".
91
 As William Lazonick 
wryly observes, Alchian and Demsetz' firm, with its denial of disciplinary power, appears not to 
be a capitalist firm at all.
92
 It does, however, at least entail a central agent, referred to as the 
firm's "owner" or "the employer", who possesses, inter alia, the right to renegotiate the contracts 
of all the suppliers of inputs.  
 Others go even further, refusing to grant any one of the contracting parties the privileged 
role of "owner" of the firm. The provision of capital, it is argued, is based on exactly the same 
sort of contract as the provision of other factors of production, hence the "irrelevance" of the 
concept of ownership of the firm.
93
 In these accounts, an attempt is made to derive both the 
manifestly hierarchical and authoritarian structure of corporations and the residual control rights 
of shareholders entirely from contract and the market, without any reference to ownership of the 
corporation or its assets. Shareholders are deemed simply owners and providers of capital, a 
factor of production like any other. It is argued, however, that as those entitled to the surplus, to 
what is left after all the other claimants have been paid, they have the greatest incentive to 
ensure that management operates in the most efficient and productive manner
94
, but that as 
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"residual claimants" whose entitlements are not precisely specified they cannot easily protect 
themselves by contract. They accept the risks associated with their residual position, therefore, 
only in return for the protections provided by the legal rules which grant them voting rights and 
compel managers to act in their interests. The distribution of authority (of property rights) 
within existing corporate structures are thus portrayed as market products: either because they 
are said to have arisen arisen spontaneously from contract, or if it is conceded that they were not 
originally the products of contracting, because they are subject to a continual process of market 
review.
95
 Whatever their origins, the fact that existing governance structures have survived 
market selection is regarded proof of their efficiency. There is, therefore, both a descriptive and 
a prescriptive dimension to the claims being made. Residual control rights and rights to the 
surplus are vested in shareholders as a result of market-contractual processes. Moreover, they 
should be vested in them - not because they "own" the assets or companies concerned but 
because this is the most efficient arrangement.
96
  
 These approaches have the advantage, at least in theory, of obviating the need to account 
for the authority vested in managers and shareholders in non-contractual, non-market terms. 
Other contractualists, however, feel unable to do this without resort once more to the idea of 
ownership. Recognising that it is impossible to foresee let alone plan for all future 
contingencies, and correspondingly impossible in practice to write a contract which 
comprehensively specifies rights in the many varied situations which might arise, they deem the 
contracts that constitute the corporation, and especially those involving shareholders, inevitably 
to be "incomplete".
97
 This is not only a source of renegotiation costs
98
 as contracts are revised 
and amended as the future unfolds, it renders vitally important the question of who is to have 
power over corporate assets and activities in situations where contractual incompleteness has 
prevented rights from being specified in advance. Power and authority - "not", Oliver Hart tells 
us, "standard feature[s] of economic theory" - thus re-enter the equation and, with this, the issue 
of ownership sneaks in through the backdoor. "A reasonable view", Hart argues, is that where 
contracts do "not specify all aspects of asset usage in every contingency ... it is the owner of the 
asset in question who has ... residual control rights over [it]", meaning "the right to decide all 
usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, or law". It 
therefore "matters who owns a piece of private property"
99
, for ownership is "a source of power 
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when contracts are incomplete". But who are the "owners" of the assets of large corporations? 
Formally, of course, the assets are owned by the corporation itself, a legal fact that hardly helps 
to resolve the question. By initially developing his so-called "property rights" theory in the 
context of closely-held or owner-managed firms, however, Hart feels able to assert that the 
owners of a company's assets are its shareholders, because it is they who exercise residual 
control rights over them - a defensible assertion in economic reality, if not in law, in relation to 
firms of this sort. However, although he recognises that it is to closely-held firms that his theory 
"applies most directly", he proceeds to extend it, virtually unmodified, to large corporations, 
blithely arguing that "even though there are important differences between the owner-managed 
and large company cases, the main insights of the property rights approach continue to be 
relevant".
100
 With this, corporate shareholders, as the possessors of residual control rights, are 
once again reunited with the corporate assets, as their "owners", and the significance of the 
changes in the process of production and in the nature of property and property rights associated 
with the rise of the modern corporation, and their impact on the idea of ownership, are more or 
less dismissed.
101
 The complex issues surrounding the nature of the corporation as an entity - 
crudely, whether it is and/or should be characterised as a public or private entity - and the 
allocation of power (and rights) in and over it are thus dealt with by the simple expedient of 
attenuating and redefining the meaning of ownership so as to encompass the position of 
shareholders. The resulting reasoning is dizzyingly circular: Hart tells us that ownership is the 
source of residual control rights, while at the same time asserting that the possession of residual 
control rights is "the definition of ownership".
102
 The rights of shareholders are thus seen as 
flowing from the pre-existing fact of their asset "ownership" while their "ownership" of those 
assets is inferred from their possession of residual control rights.  
 
 
From the Myth of Ownership to the Myth of Efficiency: Private Property and the Public-
Private Divide  
For all its many faults, however, Hart's analysis does at least address the question of power, the 
whole thrust of his argument being that "[corporate] institutional arrangements are designed to 
allocate power among agents".
103
 And in so doing, it goes to the issues at the heart of corporate 
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governance: the constitution of corporate rights and the allocation of power in and over 
corporations - what John Christman calls the "structure of [corporate] ownership".
104
 Indeed, it 
goes also to the heart of the public-private divide, for the conceptual delineation of a specifically 
private sphere of individual autonomy and sovereignty which not even the state can legitimately 
invade rests heavily on the idea of private property. This idea, as Jennifer Nedelsky says, forms 
"the foundation for everything from the public/private distinction to the ongoing market versus 
regulation debate".
105
 When, therefore, theorists assert that corporations are contractual affairs 
in whose realm the principle of public non-interference should reign, they are, for all their 
emphasis on contract, in effect making a property-based claim: that the assets of corporations, if 
not the corporations themselves, are private property and that corporate affairs are, therefore, 
private matters.  
 As many have pointed out, however, the public-private divide upon which such 
assertions are based is itself premised upon a conception of private property as an essentially 
pre-political, natural phenomenon with an existence independent of the state and the public 
sphere; in other words, on a tacit denial that property is a social construct founded on a set of 
policy choices embodied in law.
106
 Yet there are few better illustrations of the socially 
constructed, contingent and dynamic nature of ideas about property and property rights than 
those provided by corporate history. As we have seen, the changes which have occurred in the 
organisation and relations of production and in the economic nature of joint stock companies 
and their shares over the last two centuries have been accompanied by a transformation in the 
way in which companies and corporate property are perceived and constituted in law. Rights in 
and over joint stock companies were, of course, reconstituted in ways which favoured 
shareholders, enabling them to maintain their right to dividends and to appoint and dismiss 
directors despite their lack of function. But it was not inevitable that this should be the case: the 
new conceptions did not flow inexorably from the economic developments which underlay 
them. On the contrary, they were the products of policy (political) choices made by the courts 
and legislature. What corporate history highlights, therefore, is the often-overlooked role of the 
state in defining and redefining "property", underlining the fact that property and property rights 
are never truly private and always have what Kevin Gray calls a "public law character". There 
is, as he says, "in every property drama a third actor, in addition to the plaintiff and defendant, ... 
the state, expressing its collective judgement through the voice of the courts".
107
 In short, 
corporate history highlights the fact that property is not a value-free phenomenon.  
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 For Gray's near-namesake, Thomas Grey, the proliferation of property forms such as the 
share which provide titles to revenue but which lack any direct link with tangible things has 
precipitated a `disintegration of property'. In the last two hundred or so years, he argues, we have 
gone from a world in which property was "a central idea mirroring a clearly understood 
institution", to a world in which "it is no longer a coherent or crucial category on our conceptual 
scheme".
108
 He attributes this "collapse of the idea of property" to the workings of the market 
economy, to the inner logic of capitalism and its progressive exploitation of the division of 
labour and economies of scale
109
, arguing that these have led to the subdivision and 
recombination of the rights that originally made up ownership, generating property forms 
"remote from tangible objects". As a result, he says, for many specialist lawyers if not for lay 
people, the "robust unitary conception of ownership" - the idea of private property as entailing 
comprehensive and exclusive "ownership" rights over real things - has been fragmented and 
replaced by a "shadowy" bundle of rights conception in which property lacks any necessary 
connection to tangible objects.
110
 According to Grey, this "disintegration of property" has 
become a major source of political and ideological problems for capitalism. While the new 
forms of property and the economic structures that accompanied them, the corporation and share 
prominent amongst them, are "entirely consistent with full loyalty to [the market capitalist] 
system" - it is, after all, the internal logic of the market which has created them - the dissolution 
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of the traditional thing-ownership conception of property has, he argues, "erode[d] the moral 
basis of capitalism".
111
 Conceived as thing-ownership, property rights are perceived as having 
intrinsic worth linked to notions of moral right; and capitalism, to the extent that it "connotes a 
general regime of protection of private property", is able to "enlist .. on its side" the still potent 
justifications associated with this view. The problem, he argues, is that the replacement of the 
thing-ownership conception of property by a bundle-of-rights conception threatens to expose 
property for what it really is - a political relation between people; and that "the forceful 
intuitions behind the moral arguments" for simple thing-ownership do not readily transfer to the 
legal institutions and intangible property forms of modern capitalism, with the result that the 
latter is compelled to seek a moral basis in "other, more instrumental values", most notably, that 
of producing material well-being.  
 Arguably, nowhere is the erosion of these moral arguments more evident than in the 
case of shares and shareholders. The changes in the constitution of corporate property and 
corporate rights mark the completion of the historical process - inherent in the joint stock 
company as an economic form of organisation - whereby the shareholder has been externalised 
from the company and transformed into a functionless rentier, a pure money capitalist standing 
outside the process of production. An important aspect of this has been the relinquishment by 
shareholders not only of any significant managerial, supervisory or capital-providing function 
but of many of the rights traditionally associated with asset (or company) "ownership". 
Reflecting their redundancy, the bundle of rights which they have come to possess by virtue of 
their share ownership (the bundle of rights that constitute the share as a separate form of 
property) has gradually shrunk, coming to comprise but a few of the rights that would constitute 
"ownership" of the corporate assets (or corporation) in the traditional sense. Severed both from 
productive purpose and from the rest of the rights in the `thing-ownership' bundle, the moral 
basis for the remaining rights of rentier shareholders - rights which, despite their attenuated 
nature
112




 With the justifications associated with the "robust unitary conception of ownership" 
weakened, it is, then, not only capitalism but rentier shareholders who are forced to seek 
legitimacy in "other, more instrumental, values".
114
 It is in this context that the ascendancy of 
contractual theories of the corporation and their efficiency-based defence of shareholder 
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property rights needs to be seen. Although usually put forward as neutral, theoretical accounts of 
reality, these theories are more accurately seen as attempts to legitimate rentier rights in 
instrumental terms; as prescriptive rather than descriptive theories. No matter how vocipherous 
their advocates, however, claims based on grounds such as "efficiency" are inherently weaker 
and less compelling than the more fundamental, ethical claims surrounding the traditional ideas 
of private property and ownership, not least because as soon as one begins to offer a purposive 
account of why shareholders should possess these rights, arguing that they are justified for 
essentially instrumental reasons in terms of their effects, one invites not only an assessment of 
their effectiveness in achieving the stated goals, but an evaluation of those goals relative to other 
competing ones. There is certainly no doubting the current popularity of contractual theory. But 
this popularity rests less on its empirical accuracy, validity or intellectual merit and more on its 
consonance with certain powerful class interests. Contemporary company law, even if it does 
not yet explicitly embrace these theories, shares many of their presuppositions and values, and 
resembles them in its shareholder-orientation. And the current political climate, with its 
underlying neo-liberalism, its belief in the inescapability of market imperatives ("globalization") 
and its overriding emphasis on identifying the most "competitive" and "efficient" (meaning 
profitable) forms of production and governance, is very much more congenial to contractualism 
and its marketisation of the corporation than it is to its stakeholding rivals. Indeed, so great is 
the contemporary influence of contractual theory that supporters of stakeholding increasingly 
seek to demonstrate that stakeholding companies are (or would be) more efficient and 
competitive than their shareholder-oriented rivals
115
 and are increasingly willing to try to 
conceptualise corporations in predominantly contractual terms, albeit in a manner which insists 
upon the relational, "implicit" and "incomplete" nature of many of the contracts involved. 
Notwithstanding this somewhat artificial consensus, however, the struggle between 
contractarians and stakeholders is, ultimately, more about ends than means, for stakeholding is 
animated as much by ideas of right and justice as it is by ideas of competitiveness; by a 
conception of the good, rather than of the efficient, life.
116
 Indeed, stakeholders are ill-advised to 
try to fight the governance battle on the terrain of efficiency, in part because, whatever its 
current political appeal, it is a terrain which pushes one into a contractual conception of the 
corporation, with all that implies, and in part because as a goal "efficiency" in the abstract lacks 
meaning: what exactly is it that we are trying to do efficiently? At present the goal of corporate 
governance is, in reality, the efficient maximisation of rentier wealth, a task it carries out with 
aplomb. In practice this means maximising the wealth of a few, for the financial property forms 
constituted and protected by contemporary company law and contemporary mechanisms of 
corporate governance enable a small minority to appropriate a grotesquely disproportionate 
share of total social wealth and production, both nationally and internationally.
117
 The question 
                                                 
    
115
 Usually on the grounds that stakeholding companies are more sensitive to the interests of 
employees and better able, therefore, to nurture and develop the `human capital' that is said to be 
increasingly crucial to long-term efficiency and competitiveness. See, for example, John 
Plender, A Stake in the Future (London, Nicholas Brealey, 1997); and the RSA's Tomorrow's 
Company (London, RSA, 1995). It has recently become quite fashionable to insist that the case 
for stakeholding is not distributive, but efficiency-based. 
    
116
 Which is not to say that stakeholding companies are not more efficient than their 




is whether the "efficient" attainment of this goal is defensible, let alone desirable.  
 The power of the large transnational corporations which increasingly dominate the 
world economy is enormous, reminding us that the developments that have underlain the 
historical changes that have occurred in corporate theory - the externalisation of the shareholder 
from the process of production, the growing difficulties involved in characterising corporations 
as private property and shareholders as corporate owners - are, ultimately, reflections and 
expressions of the growing socialisation of production, of its increasingly social and public, 
rather than individual and private, nature. There is, therefore, much truth in Marx's claims that 
joint stock companies not only take the form of "social undertakings as distinct from private 
undertakings" but represent "the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of 
capitalist production itself". As he observed, joint stock company shareholders receive 
dividends in the form of (if not at the same level as) interest, "as mere compensation for owning 
capital that now is entirely divorced from the function in the actual process of 
reproduction...".
118
 Put simply and bluntly, in this context, the (public) constitution and 
protection of (private) corporate property rights by the state is more accurately seen not as the 
neutral enforcement of "natural" individual rights over things but as the use of collective force 
on behalf of haves over have-nots. Indeed, it is precisely because they "carry with them, when 
held in quantities larger than an individual can work by himself, power to control in some 
measure the lives of others" that property rights in land and capital are, in many ways, "in rather 
more need of justification than ... simple property in the consumable means of life".
119
 If the 
myth of shareholder corporate ownership and the perception and promotion of private property 
and private property rights as pre-social, pre-political, natural phenomena have long operated so 
as to "hide the structure of [corporate] power and insulate it from democratic debate"
120
, what 
we are now seeing, as the "powerful yet wholly spurious moral leverage"
121
 of the idea of 
shareholder corporate ownership wanes, is the emergence of a new justificatory myth for 
shareholder property rights, a myth of "efficiency". But we must not forget that all forms of 
property and property rights, including those of shareholders, represent "not a pre-transaction 
state of equilibrium or of harmony", but a politically (and, therefore, publicly) constituted and 
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contingent power relation between people that is "inherently and continually conflictual".
122
 The 
creation, sustenance and modification of (property) rights inevitably generates conflict, but as 
production relations change so, inevitably, will (and should) rights and entitlements. It is to the 
reconstitution and reallocation of corporate rights and entitlements in pursuit of democratically 
agreed goals which take account of the complex issues of social and individual well-being and 
justice involved that those concerned with company law reform and corporate governance need 
to turn their attention. 
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